National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

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Brief of Accident

Adopted 07/16/2010

DCA08MA098
File No. 0 | 09/19/2008 | Columbia, SC | Aircraft Reg No. N999LJ | Time (Local): 23:53 EDT

Make/Model:	Learjet / LR60
Engine Make/Model:	
Aircraft Damage:	Destroyed
Number of Engines:	2
Operating Certificate(s):	On-demand Air Taxi
Name of Carrier:	Global Exec Avaition
Type of Flight Operation:	Non-scheduled; Domestic; Passenger Only
Reg. Flight Conducted Under:	Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter

	Fatal	Serious	Minor/None
Crew	2	0	0
Pass	2	2	0

Last Depart. Point:	Same as Accident/Incident Location
Destination:	Van Nuys, CA
Airport Proximity:	Off Airport/Airstrip

Condition of Light:	Night
Weather Info Src:	Weather Observation Facility
Basic Weather:	Visual Conditions
Lowest Ceiling:	None
Visibility:	10.00 SM
Wind Dir/Speed:	060 / 007 Kts
Temperature (°C):	-7
Precip/Obscuration:	

Pilot-in-Command Age:

Certificate(s)/Rating(s)
Airline Transport

Instrument Ratings

Flight Time (Hours)

Total All Aircraft:	Unk/Nr
Last 90 Days:	Unk/Nr
Total Make/Model:	Unk/Nr
Total Instrument Time:	UnK/Nr

The NTSB's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/publictn.htm. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-10/02. On September 19, 2008, about 2353 eastern daylight time, a Bombardier Learjet Model 60, N999LJ, owned by Inter Travel and Services, Inc., and operated by Global Exec Aviation, overran runway 11 during a rejected takeoff at Columbia Metropolitan Airport, Columbia, South Carolina. The captain, the first officer, and two passengers were killed; two other passengers were seriously injured. The nonscheduled domestic passenger flight to Van Nuys, California, was operated under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed.
Updated at Jul 16 2010 4:51PM

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OCCURRENCES

Prior to flight - Aircraft maintenance event
Takeoff - Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
Takeoff-rejected takeoff - Runway excursion
Post-impact - Fire/smoke (post-impact)

FINDINGS

Aircraft-Aircraft systems-Landing gear system-Tire casing-Incorrect service/maintenance - C
Aircraft-Aircraft systems-Landing gear system-Tire casing-Failure
Organizational issues-Support/oversight/monitoring-Oversight-Oversight of maintenance-Operator - C
Personnel issues-Action/decision-Action-Incorrect action selection-Pilot - C
Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Use of policy/procedure-Pilot - C
Organizational issues-Development-Design-Equipment design-Manufacturer - F
Organizational issues-Development-Selection/certification/testin-Equip certification/testing-FAA/Regulator - F
Organizational issues-Development-Selection/certification/testin-Equip certification/testing-Operator - F
Organizational issues-Development-Selection/certification/testin-Personnel selection/training-Not specified - F
Personnel issues-Task performance-Communication (personnel)-CRM/MRM techniques-Flight crew - F
Organizational issues-Support/oversight/monitoring-Oversight-Equipment monitoring-Manufacturer - F
Organizational issues-Support/oversight/monitoring-Oversight-Equipment monitoring-FAA/Regulator - F
Aircraft-Aircraft power plant-Engine exhaust-Thrust reverser-Design - F
Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-Powerplant parameters-Attain/maintain not possible

Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows.
The operator’s inadequate maintenance of the airplane’s tires, which resulted in multiple tire failures during takeoff roll due to severe underinflation, and the captain’s execution of a rejected takeoff (RTO) after V1, which was inconsistent with her training and standard operating procedures.
Contributing to the accident were (1) deficiencies in Learjet’s design of and the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) certification of the Learjet Model 60’s thrust reverser system, which permitted the failure of critical systems in the wheel well area to result in uncommanded forward thrust that increased the severity of the accident; (2) the inadequacy of Learjet’s safety analysis and the FAA’s review of it, which failed to detect and correct the thrust reverser and wheel well design deficiencies after a 2001 uncommanded forward thrust accident; (3) inadequate industry training standards for flight crews in tire failure scenarios; and (4) the flight crew’s poor crew resource management (CRM).